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ADAR V. SMITH : PENALIZING INNOCENT 
CHILDREN FOR THE “SINS” OF THE PARENTS
By: Ruth Hackford-Peer1
In 2007, the Tenth Circuit held as 
unconstitutional, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
the Oklahoma adoption statute that refused to recognize 
or issue a birth certificate to a child adopted by a same-
sex couple. In 2011, on similar facts, the Fifth Circuit 
upheld Louisiana’s refusal to reissue a birth certificate to 
a child who was born in Louisiana but adopted by a 
gay male couple in New York. This recent circuit split 
highlights constitutional issues regarding the treatment 
of adopted children of gay and lesbian couples and raises 
questions in both equal protection jurisprudence and 
Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence. This Note uses 
these cases as a lens through which to explore full faith 
and credit and equal protection doctrines as applied to 
children born in one state but adopted by a same-sex 
couple out of state. This Note argues the need for a child-
centric solution to this circuit split. In particular, this 
Note (1) introduces the circuit split; (2) explores the legal 
realities of gay and lesbians and the failure of the equal 
protection doctrine to prevent discrimination against 
them — and more relevantly — their children; (3) 
discusses the split under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution; and (4) raises policy concerns 
regarding the nation’s public health and vital statistics 
program that is put at risk by the Adar holding. This 
Note concludes that children — indeed all children — 
though perhaps particularly those children marginalized 
by their same-sex parents’ marital status deserve to have 
a document that proves their identity, their parentage, 
their age, and their nationality. 
I. Introduction: By Accident of Your Birth 
— When your parents are gay or lesbian, 
you have more rights if you were born 
in Oklahoma than if you were born in 
Louisiana.
Since many dysfunctional, abusive households have 
a mother and a father present, it’s clear that being 
heterosexual is not necessarily a qualification for being 
a good parent.2
Betty DeGeneres
On August 3, 2007, the Tenth Circuit held 
as unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause the Oklahoma adoption statute that refused 
to recognize an adoption by a same-sex couple.3 The 
court reasoned that not only did Oklahoma have to 
recognize the adoption and give full faith and credit 
to it, Oklahoma “already has the necessary mechanism 
for enforcing judgments.”4 The same-sex parents 
merely sought to have Oklahoma apply its own laws 
to “enforce their adoption order in an even-handed 
manner.”5 On April 12th, 2011, on similar facts, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld Louisiana’s refusal to reissue a 
birth certificate to a child who was born in Louisiana 
but adopted by a gay male couple in New York. The 
court determined neither the Full Faith & Credit 
Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution require Louisiana to do so.6 The 
court further noted that Louisiana “recognized” the 
New York adoption but reasoned the reissuance of a 
birth certificate was an enforcement measure and held 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “does not oblige 
Louisiana to confer particular benefits on unmarried 
adoptive parents contrary to its law.”7 
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the District of Columbia where same-sex couples can 
legally marry.10 There are sixteen states and the District 
of Columbia where same-sex couples can petition to 
adopt statewide.11 Utah, Louisiana, and Mississippi 
have adoption laws that essentially prohibit same-
sex couples from adopting in their jurisdictions.12 
Estimates vary on the number of children raised by 
same-sex couples in the United States but the figures 
often cited range from 1,000,000 to more than 
9,000,000.13
Until recently, lawmakers had been able to 
overtly discriminate against gays and lesbians as a 
class.14 In 1952 the American Psychological Association 
classified homosexuality as a mental illness.15 In the 
same year Congress passed the McCarran-Walter 
Immigration and Nationality Act,16 which excluded 
from entry into the United States “psychopathic 
personalities.”17 The Supreme Court not only upheld 
the law in deportation proceedings against a gay 
man in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Services,18 but noted that “[t]he legislative history 
of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic 
personality’ to include homosexuals ….”19 In 1953, 
President Eisenhower prohibited gays and lesbians 
from federal employment.20 Perhaps the best example 
of class-based discrimination against gays and lesbians 
is evident in the history of statutes that criminalize 
consensual same-sex sodomy.21
Though undoubtedly curbed somewhat 
recently due to favorable holdings in Lawrence v. 
Texas22 and Romer v. Evans,23 lawmakers can still 
use their lawmaking power to discriminate against 
gay and lesbian individuals and families.24 Despite 
this history of discrimination, the Supreme Court 
has not yet definitively weighed in on whether gays 
and lesbians constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class and are thus entitled to a higher level of judicial 
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis.25 Still, 
the Court has struck down discriminatory laws using 
a seemingly more exacting form of rational basis.26 In 
Lawrence, the Court struck down a sodomy statute 
used to prosecute two men for engaging in consensual 
sex in the privacy of their home.27 In Romer, the 
Court used rational basis to strike down as a violation 
of equal protection a Colorado state constitutional 
amendment that repealed state and local laws barring 
sexual-orientation discrimination.28 
The circuit split between the Tenth Circuit 
and the Fifth Circuit gives rise to questions regarding 
both Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit 
jurisprudence. Among these questions are: how can 
the children of same-sex couples be protected? Should 
gays and lesbians have heightened scrutiny under 
equal protection analysis? Should children of same-
sex couples receive heightened scrutiny under equal 
protection? Does the Full Faith & Credit Clause 
require interstate recognition of an adoption decree 
and if so, when does that recognition require one 
state to trounce on another state’s public policy? 
Finally, does a child have a fundamental right to an 
accurate birth certificate that reflects his or her legal 
familial realities? 
This Note takes up these questions and 
argues the need for a child-centric solution to this 
circuit split. Part II of this Note explores the legal 
realities of gays and lesbians and the failure of the 
equal protection doctrine to prevent discrimination 
against them and their families. Part III explores the 
possibility of the equal protection doctrine being 
applied to the children of same-sex couples as a way 
to secure benefits and protections that are currently 
denied to the children. Part IV details the full faith and 
credit issues and further explores the facts of Finstuen 
and Adar. Part V raises policy concerns regarding 
the nation’s public health and vital statistics program 
should the holding in Adar be undisturbed. Part VI 
concludes with the prediction — and the hope — 
that the Finstuen holding will eventually prevail. 
II. Equal Protection: Equal for Whom?
If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the 
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that 
a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.8 
Justice William J. Brennan Jr.
The legal status of same-sex couples, 
and indeed the legal status of their families, is not 
yet settled in law. The Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”) ensures that no state shall “be required 
to give effect to” same-sex marriages from any other 
state and defines marriage for purposes of federal law 
as a “legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife.”9 Currently there are six states and 
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The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that states may not “deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”29 The equal protection framework applies 
when a law either draws a distinction among people 
based on a particular characteristic or when the law 
is facially neutral, but there is a discriminatory impact 
or effect on a particular class.30 Most laws are subject 
to rational review, the most deferential standard.31 
Only when the court deems the classification 
to categorize based on certain protected classes, 
(considered “suspect”32 or “quasi-suspect”33 classes) 
will the court look more closely at the law, its purpose, 
and the “fit” between the law and its purpose.34 In 
looking at the “fit,” a court will consider whether 
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest.35 Equal protection is often 
discussed as a three-tiered approach and some scholars 
have advocated for a complete overhaul of equal 
protection doctrine.36 
Lower courts have also been reluctant to 
designate gays and lesbians as a suspect or quasi-
suspect class.37 Although recently some courts have 
done just that.38 When a court designates a group 
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, every law that 
implicates a facial classification of that group by its 
class is entitled to heightened scrutiny.39 Perhaps 
this partly explains why the Supreme Court has 
not — since 1977 — designated any new groups as 
quasi-suspect or suspect classes, though the Court 
has had the chance to review cases involving gays 
and lesbians, the indigent, and the developmentally 
disabled.40 This hesitance is not new; in 1927 the 
Court referred to equal protection as “the usual last 
resort of constitutional arguments ….”41
Some have made the argument that gays and 
lesbians ought to receive heightened judicial scrutiny, 
which would protect them and their families from 
possible legislative biases.42 Currently, most courts 
apply rational basis scrutiny, which requires only a 
rational relationship between the law’s classification 
and the law’s legitimate purpose.43 Rational basis 
scrutiny offers little protection to gays and lesbians 
as a class. Until the Supreme Court intervenes, 
state legislatures will likely continue to discriminate 
against gay and lesbian individuals and families, 
though perhaps less openly. Perhaps because of 
cases like Romer and Lawrence, there seems to be a 
greater trend of policy makers couching their anti-
gay biases in statutes that, on their face, do not target 
gays and lesbians.44 Legislators can invoke DOMA, 
which provides that no state will be required to 
extend marriage rights to same-sex couples without 
its consent. Policy makers in more conservative states 
can now condition certain rights, such as adoption 
rights, on the status of being married and assure 
that same-sex couples will have a difficult time 
making an effective equal protection claim because 
the facial classification is “marriage” and not “sexual 
orientation”.45
Essentially, unmarried heterosexual couples 
and their families are shafted alongside same-sex 
couples so that these statutes will not reveal a sheer 
animus toward same-sex couples.46 The children of 
same-sex couples suffer the most.47 
Situated within this background of uncertain 
legal rights for same-sex couples, are the children 
of these couples. These children exist with all the 
complexity and diversity of typical modern families 
but there is an added layer of complexity by virtue of 
the children’s parents being the same sex. This Note 
focuses on adoptive children of same-sex couples. 
These children have a legally established relationship 
with both their parents regardless of whether one 
parent also has biological ties to the child. 
III. What about the Children?
One of the most fundamental social interests is that 
law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be 
nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor 
or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.48
Benjamin N. Cardozo
“Since the first generation of lesbian mother 
family law issues … advocates have been fighting to 
keep the focus on the children.”49 The issue often gets 
framed as one of discrimination or oppression, which 
ultimately focuses on the individual same-sex couple 
or on gay and lesbian people more generally.50 “The 
framing of the issue as one of discrimination tends 
to overlook the effects on children and reinforces 
the tactics of the opponents of recognizing same-sex 
families.” 51 Advocates should insist on keeping the 
focus on children. One way to do this is to put in the 
forefront the benefits and protections denied to the 
children of same-sex couples because of their parents’ 
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inability to marry. The issue is not that the parents 
are denied the benefits and protections of marriage, 
but that their children are denied the benefits and 
protections of their parents being married. When 
referencing heterosexual family life, courts already 
emphasize the importance of raising children as being 
intermingled with the importance of marriage.52 
One of the key contemporary  
justifications for marital laws is that 
marriage directly and indirectly 
benefits the children reared by the 
couple …. If the goal were truly 
child welfare, the most direct way 
of accomplishing the goal would 
be permitting all couples that have 
children to marry. Such a policy 
would be easy to administer, and 
would acknowledge that all children 
are equally entitled to the rights 
and benefits purportedly created  
for child welfare …. [T]he reality 
is that there is a large class of chil-
dren that are not able to have their 
development assisted by rights pur-
portedly created for their benefit.53 
The issue of same-sex marriage is beyond 
the purview of this Note, but the focus should 
remain the same — on the children. In the case at 
hand, even if the state of Louisiana has a legitimate 
state interest in denying adoption rights to same-
sex couples, what purpose can denying that child an 
accurate birth certificate serve to the state? A birth 
certificate is recognized as a fundamental document 
that proves identity, parentage, age, and nationality.54 
It is important for a range of activities, and can be 
required for sports, for jobs, to get public assistance, 
to get a passport required for travel, and most 
importantly, would prove parentage in the case of 
a medical emergency.55
The Supreme Court has applied intermediate 
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for 
classifications based on illegitimacy.56 “[I]mposing 
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility 
or wrongdoing.”57 The Court went on to state, “no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing 
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as 
an unjust — way of deterring the parent.”58 In 
Plyler v. Doe,59 the Supreme Court recognized that 
intermediate scrutiny for children does not apply 
only to illegitimate children but anytime the state is 
punishing a child for the parents’ misconduct.60 The 
Plyler Court ruled that withholding state educational 
funds from undocumented children and allowing 
local school districts to deny enrollment to these 
children is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.61 
The Court extended the equal protection doctrine 
beyond illegitimate children, holding anytime 
there is “legislation directing the onus of a parent’s 
misconduct against his children [it] does not comport 
with fundamental notions of justice.”62 Further, the 
Court decided the case on equal protection grounds, 
noting “[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended 
to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-
based and invidious class-based legislation.”63 Sex 
classifications also receive intermediate scrutiny. 
Applying intermediate scrutiny would offer 
increased protections for same-sex couples and their 
children because it requires the law that classifies 
regarding sexual orientation to do so because of 
an important government interest (a higher bar 
than a legitimate government interest) and the fit 
between the law and the interest must substantially 
advance that interest (not just be rationally related 
to it). Indeed, no longer will theoretical justifications 
suffice, but the government interest must actually be 
the purpose for which the law was passed. 
These precedents should serve as guide-
posts when legislatures, courts, and executive officials 
withhold benefits and protections to children of same-
sex couples on account of the marital status and/or 
sexual orientation of their parents. It is surprising then 
that the majority in Adar quickly dismissed the equal 
protection argument, ignored Plyler, and limited 
the Weber line of cases to biological illegitimacy.64 
Consequently the Adar court applied rational basis 
to the classification.65 The Adar court then compared 
marriage outcomes with cohabitation outcomes 
noting marriage “is associated with better outcomes 
for children since marriage is more likely to provide 
the stability necessary for the healthy development of 
children.”66 The court reasoned that, “Louisiana may 
rationally conclude that having parenthood focused 
on a married couple or single individual — not the 
freely severable relationship of unmarried partners — 
furthers the interest of adopted children.”67 
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Because the lower court in Adar granted 
summary judgment to the parents on the full faith 
and credit issue, it declined to reach the equal 
protection issue.68 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, 
dismissed the equal protection claim without it ever 
being heard by the lower court. Typically, the only 
time the Fifth Circuit addresses an issue that was not 
first addressed by the district court is “when such issue 
presents a pure question of law, the proper resolution 
of which is beyond any doubt.”69 The district court 
in Finstuen certainly did not find the issue to be one 
such matter of law beyond any doubt.70 While the 
Tenth Circuit decided Finstuen on the states’ full faith 
and credit obligations, the district court in Finstuen v. 
Edmondson71 held Oklahoma’s adoption amendments 
constituted an equal protection violation.72 The 
Adar court was not troubled by the equal protection 
challenge and was not persuaded by the Weber line of 
cases nor by Finstuen on this matter. 
IV. The Circuit Split: Recognition  
or Enforcement?
The real issue is not whether the court of either state 
must conform its decision to that of the other, but 
whether both must not conform their decisions in this 
field to some federal constitutional standard.73
Justice Robert H. Jackson
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: 
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of 
every other State.”74 The purpose of the clause “was 
to alter the status of the several states as independent 
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations 
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings 
of the others ….”75 The clause upholds the intent that 
individual states be “integral parts of a single nation 
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation 
might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the 
state of its origin.”76 The Clause “is not to be applied, 
accordion-like, to accommodate our personal 
predilections. It substituted a command for the earlier 
principles of comity and thus basically altered the 
status of the States as independent sovereigns.”77 
Though the clause’s intent and purpose is 
clear, its application has never been. Sixty-six years 
ago, former Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson 
said this about the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
[I]t is doubtful if a century and a half 
of constitutional interpretation has 
advanced us much beyond where 
we would be if there had never been 
such a clause. Local policies and 
balance of local interest still domi-
nate the application of the federal 
requirement. This is more strange 
since the states have less to fear 
from a strong federalist influence 
in dealing with this than with most 
other constitutional provisions. 
The Federal Government stands 
to gain little at the expense of the 
states through any application of it. 
Anything taken from a state by way 
of freedom to deny faith and credit 
to law of others is thereby added to 
the state by way of a right to exact 
faith and credit for its own.78
The Clause has now undergone more than 
two centuries of “constitutional interpretation,” but 
the recent Adar decision makes one wonder if the 
jurisprudence “has advanced us much beyond where 
we would be if there had never been such a clause.” 
One aspect of the Clause remains clear; judicial 
precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws from 
that owed to judgments.79 
Regarding statutes, a court may be guided by 
a forum state’s public policy.80 Regarding judgments, 
the full faith and credit obligation is exacting and 
gives rise to no “roving public policy exception” to 
the full faith and credit due.81 The Supreme Court 
has held that credit must be given to the judgment 
of another state although the forum would not be 
required to entertain the suit itself.82 “Full faith and 
credit, however, does not mean that States must 
adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, 
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.”83 
The power to determine the time, manner, and 
mechanisms for enforcing judgments is reserved for 
the forum state and does not travel with a sister state’s 
judgment.84 “Orders commanding action or inaction 
have been denied enforcement in a sister State ….”85 
These enforcement measures “remain subject to the 
even-handed control of forum law.”86 
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One such illustrative case is Rosin v. Monken.87 
Rosin accepted a plea agreement for a misdemeanor 
offense of non-consensual sexual contact in New York 
that did not require him to register as a sex offender in 
New York.88 While living in Illinois, the local police 
department informed him that he was required to 
register as a sex offender in Illinois.89 He brought suit 
alleging Illinois failed to give full faith and credit due 
to the judgment of the New York court. 90 He asserted 
that Illinois could not force him to register as a sex 
offender in its jurisdiction.91 The court disagreed, 
noting the absence in the order of any provision 
relieving him of an obligation to register in any state 
other than New York.92 The court also reasoned that, 
even if the order did contain such language, “[one 
state] has no extra-territorial jurisdiction to exercise 
police power in [another state].”93 Though a public 
policy exception does not exist for judgments, another 
exception does.94 One state cannot use the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause to “interfere impermissibly with 
the exclusive affairs of another.”95 New York simply 
lacks the power to “dictate the means by which Illinois 
can protect its public.”96 
Justice Jackson was adamantly opposed to any 
public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, believing such an exception would strip the 
clause of all practical meaning.97 He advocated for a 
broad reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
believing that the clause should “meet the needs of 
an expanding national society for a modern system 
of administering, inexpensively and expeditiously, a 
more certain justice.”98 In dealing with full faith and 
credit problems, Jackson asserts the “policy ultimately 
to be served … is the federal policy of ‘a more perfect 
union’ of our legal systems.”99
Whether the policy of ‘a more perfect union’ is 
best served by a narrow or a more broad interpretation 
of “recognition” and indeed “enforcement” is 
dependent on one’s views of same-sex marriage, same-
sex adoption, and same-sex parenting generally. In 
order to take up the intricacies of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and its obligation to “recognize,” but 
not necessarily “enforce” sister-state judgments, the 
facts of Finstuen and Adar become illustrative. 
a. Finstuen v. Crutcher — A Story of State 
“Recognition” of Judgments
Three same-sex couples and their adopted 
children brought a challenge to Oklahoma’s adoption 
law that refused to recognize out of state adoptions by 
same-sex couples.100 The first couple, Greg Hample 
and Ed Swaya, adopted a child, in 2002, in their 
home state of Washington.101 The parents petitioned 
the child’s birth state of Oklahoma for a valid birth 
certificate, but the state refused to list both parents 
on the form.102 The couple contested the action, 
prompting the Oklahoma State Department of Health 
(“OSDH”) to seek an opinion from the Oklahoma 
Attorney General whether the state was required to 
list both men on the birth certificate.103 The Attorney 
General, citing the United State Constitution’s Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, opined that Oklahoma was 
required to issue the child an updated birth certificate 
reflecting both of the child’s legal parents.104 The 
OSDH issued the couple a birth certificate that listed 
both men as parents.105 The state legislature responded 
a month later by enacting what the Finstuen court 
called the “adoption amendments,” which statutorily 
gave Oklahoma the right to refuse to recognize a 
same-sex adoption from any jurisdiction.106 The 
Hample/Swaya family’s claim was dismissed for lack 
of standing because they had received a valid revised 
birth certificate, therefore, their injury — refraining 
from visiting Oklahoma — was too speculative.107 
Two other couples were involved in the 
litigation. The second couple — Anne Magro and 
Heather Finstuen — lived in Oklahoma but their 
children were born and adopted in New Jersey.108 The 
couple has valid revised birth certificates from New 
Jersey.109 The Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed the 
Finstuen/Magro family’s claim for lack of standing 
because the children had valid New Jersey birth 
certificates.110 
The third couple — Lucy Doel and Jennifer 
Doel — sought an Oklahoma birth certificate for their 
child, who was born in Oklahoma but adopted in 
California.111 OSDH issued a birth certificate naming 
only Lucy Doel as her mother and denied the couple’s 
request to have a revised birth certificate naming both 
parents.112 Ultimately only the Doels satisfied the 
standing requirement of “injury in fact.”113 
In addition to showing that the OSDH 
refused to revise the child’s birth certificate to reflect 
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the child’s legal realities, the Doel couple encountered 
a medical emergency and were told by an ambulance 
crew and emergency room personnel that only “the 
mother” could accompany the child in a medical 
emergency.114 
After a lengthy discussion of jurisdictional 
issues,115 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court decision that the adoption amendment was 
unconstitutional because “the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause requires Oklahoma to recognize adoptions 
— including same-sex couples’ adoptions — that 
are validly decreed in other states.”116 The Tenth 
Circuit noted that an adoption, though sometimes 
called a “decree” or “order” refers to a final adoption 
decision, and is a “court’s final determination of the 
rights and obligations of the parties in a case” and as 
such is a final judgment of the court.117 The Tenth 
Circuit then reiterated the precedential distinction 
between statutes and judgments under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, noting that the clause “applies 
unequivocally to … judgments of sister states.”118 
In holding the Oklahoma adoption amendment 
unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit quoted the 
Supreme Court in Baker, “[r]egarding judgments … 
the full faith and credit obligation is exacting” and 
there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full 
faith and credit due judgments.”119 
The Finstuen court reasoned that OSDH’s 
“argument improperly conflates Oklahoma’s 
obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister 
state’s judgment with its authority to apply its own 
state laws in deciding what state-specific rights 
and responsibilities flow from that judgment.”120 
The court noted that if “Oklahoma had no statute 
providing for the issuance of supplementary birth 
certificates for adopted children, the Doels could not 
invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause in asking 
Oklahoma for a new birth certificate.”121 Enforcement 
of the judgment is transferred to the laws of the forum 
state (in this case Oklahoma), which means Oklahoma 
law applies. Oklahoma law has a method to deal with 
reissuance of birth certificates. “The State Registrar, 
upon receipt of a certificate of a decree of adoption, 
shall prepare a supplementary birth certificate in the 
new name of the adopted person with the names of 
the adopted parents listed as the parents.”122 Same-sex 
couples and their children are entitled to evenhanded 
enforcement of Oklahoma’s own laws.123
b. Adar v. Smith — A Story of State 
“Enforcement” of Judgments 
The facts of Adar are quite similar to the 
facts in Finstuen. In this case, Mickey Smith and 
Oren Adar, a gay couple then living in New York 
legally adopted a Louisiana-born infant (Infant J) in 
2006.124 The couple petitioned the Louisiana state 
Registrar to revise the child’s birth certificate to reflect 
the adoption.125 The Fifth Circuit held that no such 
suit could be filed in federal district court because the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause is an obligation upon 
state courts and does not create a basis for federal 
court jurisdiction.126 Further, the Fifth Circuit held, 
the only “remedy for a state’s refusal to discharge its 
obligations under the [Full Faith and Credit Clause] 
remains an appeal to the Supreme Court.”127 The 
Fifth Circuit then advanced the opinion that even 
if 42 U.S.C. Section 1983128 provides a remedy for 
Full Faith and Credit Clause violations, the Louisiana 
Registrar did not deny recognition of the New York 
Adoption decree.129 
Understanding the reasoning of the 
Fifth Circuit requires separating the concepts of 
“recognition” and “enforcement.” Though the Fifth 
Circuit admits that judgments give rise to “exacting” 
credit obligations, the “enforcements of judgments is 
subject to the evenhanded control of forum law.”130 
The Fifth Circuit noted that evenhanded “means 
only that the state executes a sister state judgment 
in the same way that it would execute judgments in 
the forum court.”131 Thus, the reasoning continues, 
since Louisiana does not issue adoptions for same-sex 
couples, then Louisiana does not have to issue revised 
birth certificates for children born in Louisiana but 
adopted out of state. 
Louisiana and its Registrar have not 
refused to recognize the validity of the New York 
adoption decree, the adoption is arguably sufficiently 
recognized for full faith and credit purposes, but 
Louisiana insists nothing in the adoption order 
entitles the child to an accurate birth certificate.132 
“[T]he mechanics for enforcing a judgment do not 
travel with the judgment itself for purposes of full 
faith and credit.”133 According to the Fifth Circuit, 
“Louisiana is competent to legislate in the area of 
family relations, and the manner in which it enforces 
out-of-state adoptions does not deny them full faith 
and credit.”134 
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c. Searching for an “Exacting” Story of 
“Evenhanded” “Enforcement” of Forum Law
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Adar is 
problematic both as a matter of public policy and as 
a doctrinal application of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. First, against precedent and policy,135the Adar 
court cited Thompson v. Thompson136 as foreclosing 
a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against executive 
actors who violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.137 
A Section 1983 action has the effect of voiding any 
state statute that deprives an individual of any right 
arising from the United States Constitution.138 In 
Thompson, “the principal problem Congress sought 
to remedy was the inapplicability of full faith and 
credit requirements to custody determinations.” 139 
The solution Congress adopted was the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act — a statutory “command 
to state courts to give full faith and credit to the child 
custody decrees of other states.”140 The legislative 
history makes it clear that Congress did not intend 
Federal Courts to play an enforcement role.141 
The facts of Thompson simply cannot be 
compared to the facts in Adar. Thompson is a suit 
between an ex-husband and an ex-wife; it is naturally 
limited “as a suit between two private parties.”142 Adar 
is a “private party against a state actor.”143 As such, 
the petitioners in Adar “have no need for an implied 
cause of action: Section 1983 expressly provides them 
with the only remedy they seek and the only one they 
need.”144 In every case that the Fifth Circuit cites 
to support the proposition that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause affords only a rule of decision in state 
courts, the defendant was a private citizen, not a state 
official.145 “This is the only reason why the default 
federal remedies that are available in actions against 
state officials, i.e., the doctrine of Ex Parte Young and 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, were not available against 
the private actors in Thompson and its progeny.”146 
The Fifth Circuit misapplied the law in 
Adar in a second way as well. An adoption, as a final 
judgment, is binding throughout the country.147 
In fairness, occasionally interested parties, like 
grandparents or foster parents are permitted to 
challenge an adoption.148 Though, it does not make 
sense to allow an uninterested party to challenge 
such adoption.149 In Finstuen, the OSDH advanced 
the argument that Oklahoma was not required to 
recognize an out-of-state adoption decree because the 
Oklahoma Commissioner of Health was not a party 
to the judgment.150 The court ultimately rejected 
the argument because it “would vitiate the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause by seemingly requiring each state 
in the nation to be a party to the original action in 
a sister state in order for the resulting judgment to 
be enforced across the country.” 151 
Even if Louisiana truly recognizes the out-
of-state adoption of Infant J and reissuing a birth 
certificate is an enforcement measure, it must be 
noted that the parents are trying to seek enforcement 
of a Louisiana statute, not a New York statute. The 
Fifth Circuit relies on the 1915 Supreme Court Case 
of Hood v. McGehee152 to advance its enforcement 
theory. In Hood, a man adopted children in 
Louisiana, and then bought property in Alabama.153 
At his death, the children brought an action to 
quiet title to the land in Alabama. 154 Under Louisiana 
law, the adopted children would have inheritance 
rights to the property but under the Alabama 
inheritance statute, children could not inherit land 
by or through an adoptive parent.155 The Supreme 
Court held that there is “no failure to give full 
credit to the adoption of the Plaintiff, in a provision 
denying them the right to inherit land in another 
state. Alabama is sole mistress of the devolution 
of Alabama land by descent.”156
The Hood case is not the best case to analogize 
to Adar. The petitioners are not attempting to impose 
New York’s adoption practices nor New York’s 
vital statistics statute upon Louisiana. Petitioners 
acknowledge that Louisiana law governs the issue, 
not New York law.157 The reliance on Hood only 
strengthens the argument that Louisiana must reissue 
Infant J an accurate birth certificate. 
The problem is not just that Louisiana 
refuses to issue a valid birth certificate to Infant J, but 
that Louisiana refuses to issue a valid birth certificate 
to Infant J even though its own vital statistics law 
requires it to do so.158 Louisiana’s own vital statistics 
statute regarding adoption decrees provides, “[u]pon 
receipt of the … decree, the state registrar shall make 
a new record in its archives, showing: … [t]he names 
of the adoptive parents and any other data about 
them that is available and adds to the completeness 
of the certificate of the adopted child.”159 There is no 
forum state issue here. The couple is not trying to 
get New York’s birth certificate statute to reach into 
Louisiana. They are merely trying to get Louisiana to 
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apply its own vital statistics statute without prejudice 
toward them as the legal parents of their Louisiana-
born child. 
Louisiana’s vital statistics statute is separate 
from Louisiana’s adoption statute. The vital statistics 
statute directs the registrar on how to record a foreign 
adoption for vital statistics purposes. Louisiana’s 
adoption statute limits adoption to single individuals 
and married couples and prevents same-sex couples 
from adopting in Louisiana.160 Louisiana’s own vital 
statistics law requires the Registrar to reissue an 
accurate birth certificate for an adopted child who 
was born in Louisiana.161 Pursuant to its adoption 
statute, Louisiana does not issue adoption judgments 
to same-sex couples, which Louisiana has not been 
forced to do. Pursuant to its vital statistics statute, 
Louisiana is required to re-issue birth certificates 
to children born in Louisiana, but adopted outside 
of the state. 
In order to see the flaw in the holding in Adar, 
consider Louisiana’s own statutes. It may be helpful to 
consider Louisiana’s adoption statute as representing 
its public policy. Because of Louisiana’s public policy 
concerns, it does not allow for same-sex adoptions. 
To continue this analogy, Louisiana’s vital statistics 
statute then represents its records obligations. The 
Registrar refused to issue a revised birth certificate for 
Infant J even though Louisiana’s own vital statistics 
law requires it. To support its lack of recognition/
discriminatory enforcement of New York’s judgment, 
Louisiana cites its adoption law as authority for this 
discriminatory act, a law that is wholly separate from 
Louisiana’s vital statistics statute.162 
Evenhanded enforcement of an out-of-state 
adoption decree, under Louisiana’s own state law 
requires the registrar to issue a new birth certificate that 
includes the names of the adoptive parents. There is 
nothing “evenhanded” about purporting to recognize an 
out of state adoption yet, refusing to follow Louisiana’s 
own law in reissuing a revised birth certificate. The 
State Registrar’s refusal to provide an amended birth 
certificate that accurately reflects the legal parent/child 
relationship to some children adopted in states other 
than Louisiana is not only a denial of recognition of 
those out-of-state adoptions, but is also a denial of 
evenhanded enforcement of Louisiana’s own forum 
law, running afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
If Louisiana’s adoption statute represents its 
public policy and its vital statistics statute its records 
obligations, then the holding in Adar appears to be 
nothing more than Louisiana trying to assert a public 
policy exception into the credit owed to judgments. 
Why else would it apply its own vital statistics law 
to some adoptions, issuing valid birth certificates to 
those children, but refuse to do so for children of 
same-sex couples? 
Considering the denial of certiorari, these 
misapplications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
appear not to concern the United States Supreme 
Court. Perhaps the risk to the vital statistics program 
of the nation is more concerning to the Court 
or Congress. 
V. Birth Certificates: What’s in a name? Or Two?
I found it almost impossible to imagine how one would 
go through life without an identity.163
Anil Kapoor
The children in this case were not provided 
accurate birth certificates, so they will become adults 
without identification that adequately reflects who 
they are. 
Louisiana’s refusal to issue an accurate birth 
certificate for these individuals undermines the 
accuracy of Louisiana’s vital records and, in fact, 
the entire United States vital statistics program. 
This refusal means that an incorrect birth certificate 
remains on file for many children. The child’s birth 
certificate is inaccurate in that it lists the names of 
the biological parents who are no longer the child’s 
legal parents. Numerous complications arise because 
birth certificates are widely recognized as providing 
identity, nationality, and parentage.164 
Birth certificates are widely used by coaches 
of sports teams to determine age, by schools for 
eligibility purposes, for employment purposes, and 
are used to obtain other documents such as driver’s 
licenses, social security cards, and passports.165 Birth 
certificates are also widely used to determine public 
assistance eligibility for state and federal benefits.166 In 
a medical emergency, a birth certificate serves as proof 
of legal parentage and thus may be needed by same-
sex couples in order to direct the medical services of 
their child.167
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In 1989, the United Nations Convention on 
Rights of the Child (“CRC”), acknowledged birth 
registration as a fundamental human right.168 The 
CRC is the most widely ratified human rights treaty.169 
The United States and Somalia are currently the only 
countries that have not adopted its provisions.170 
Plan International, a child’s rights/anti-poverty 
organization, has launched a global campaign to 
achieve universal birth registration.171 Although Plan 
International focuses on the problems experienced 
by children whose birth has not been registered at 
all, certainly some of these problems, and perhaps 
others, arise when a child has a legally inaccurate 
birth certificate. The CRC has identified the impact 
of non-registration on children to include negative 
consequences in education, health, employment, 
problems with statelessness, and consequences in 
conflicts, wars, and natural disasters.172 
Such registration also offers protection 
against exploitation, including trafficking, illegal 
adoption, child labor, and early military service.173 
Child trafficking was so pervasive following the Asian 
tsunami of 2004, that in some instances, many adults 
came forward to collect the same child. 174 “During 
conflicts and wars, identity becomes important as 
children and their families are often displaced.”175 
The connection between accurate registration and 
public health has historical roots. It was the fear of 
cholera that drove the need for precise statistics, as 
it was early sanitarians who pressed for effective and 
comprehensive registration laws.176 
Some in the United States see these problems 
as primarily issues of developing countries, which for 
the most part is true.177 It is arrogant, though, for 
people in the United States to think that the problems 
other countries face will never impact its boundaries. 
Imagine a large-scale emergency such as Hurricane 
Katrina, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a 
tragic earthquake, or even a simple car accident. Now 
imagine a child who is orphaned or separated from 
his parents during such an event. Now imagine that a 
same-sex couple has adopted this child but the child’s 
birth certificate names only his biological parents who 
have relinquished their legal rights to the child. 
As a matter of public policy — and to 
protect the accuracy and vitality of its vital statistics 
— the United States Congress should insist that the 
individual states record legally accurate information 
on a child’s birth certificate. Vital statistics as a 
state function was nothing more than a historical 
accident anyway.178 Because of the bicameral system 
of representation, the United States Constitution 
provided for the decennial census.179 Thus the census 
has always been a national function.180 “The need 
for vital statistics … was unrecognized when the 
Constitution was framed, and the vital records and 
statistics system developed originally not as a national 
undertaking, but first as a local, then as a State 
function.”181 “The vital statistics of the United States 
are collected and published through a decentralized, 
cooperative system. Responsibility for registration 
of births … is vested in the individual States.”182 
This is not the states’ prerogative; it is the states’ 
responsibility. In the United States,
[v]ital records are the primary source 
of the most fundamental public 
health information. Data on births, 
access to prenatal care, maternal 
risk factors, infant mortality, causes 
of death, and life expectancy are 
examples of the type of information 
provided by vital statistics. Over the 
past 100 years, the national vital sta-
tistics system has matured into a pro-
gram that can provide complete and 
continuous information on issues of 
importance to the Nation’s health.183 
The United States does recognize the 
federal interest in the health, the education and the 
welfare of its citizens in the maintenance of accurate 
vital statistics data.184 Currently, the collaboration 
between the National Center for Health Statistics 
and individual states “set forth the principles and 
procedures essential for complete and accurate 
registration of vital events.”185 Accurate vital statistics 
requires dealing with the various legal realities 
including realities of legitimation cases, foundling 
cases, and cases of adoption: 
In all States, special consideration 
is given to adoption …. The recent 
tendency among the States has been 
to make legislative provision for new 
birth certificates in these instances. 
The law specifies that the original 
certificate in adoption cases shall 
be sealed with the certified court 
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order of adoption, while a new birth 
certificate is prepared showing the 
adopting persons as the parents.186 
Though the legal responsibility for the 
registration of vital records fall on the individual 
States, The 1992 Model State Vital Statistics Act and 
Regulations acknowledges the federal government 
works in partnership with the states to “build a 
uniform system that produces records to satisfy the 
legal requirements of individuals and their families 
and also to meet statistical and research needs at 
the local, State, and national levels.”187 “No Federal 
requirement exist[s] regarding the reporting and 
collection of birth certificate information.”188 It is 
time that Congress act under its Commerce authority 
to standardize the state birth certificates, require legal 
accuracy,189 and require uniformity in the states’ birth 
certificate reporting. Alternately, Congress could alter 
the United States’ vital statistics program to conform 
to other countries’ systems that overwhelmingly 
have national systems of registration.190 The federal 
interest is simply too important to allow a state to 
undermine the accuracy and legitimacy of the entire 
vital records program. The impermissible holding of 
Adar allows Louisiana to maintain legally inaccurate 
birth registrations, thus allowing states to shirk their 
responsibilities under this system. If Louisiana can do 
this, what is stopping any other state from doing so? 
VI. Conclusion: Suffer Little Children
But Jesus said, Suffer little children, and forbid them not, 
to come unto me: for of such is the kingdom of heaven.191 
Matthew 19:14
Children of same-sex couples, indeed all 
children, deserve the benefits and protections assured 
to them by the document that proves their identity, 
their parentage, their age and their nationality. While 
both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
provide a possible avenue to rectify the holding 
in Adar, Congress, too, has the power to enact 
legislation that put children first. Neither the courts 
nor legislatures should be off the hook, until this 
needed reform is accomplished. 
Justice Jackson had another relevant 
statement regarding states’ obligations to each other: 
[T]he [F]ull [F]aith and [C]redit [C]
lause is the foundation of any hope 
we may have for a truly national 
system of justice, based on the pres-
ervation but better integration of 
the local jurisdictions we have. If I 
have any message to the legal profes-
sion worthy of the occasion it is this: 
that you must not suffer this lawyer’s 
clause to become the orphan clause 
of the Constitution.192
It seems fitting that Justice Jackson warns not 
to let the Full Faith and Credit Clause become the 
orphan clause of the constitution. Particularly fitting 
after Adar because this narrow interpretation of the 
clause, quite literally, creates orphans. 
All hope is not lost. Although the Supreme 
Court did not grant certiorari on this particular 
appeal, there is still the possibility Adar will be 
overruled by the United States Supreme Court who 
may resolve this split and clarify the full faith and 
credit obligations states owe each other. Congress may 
enact legislation to resolve this split as well, perhaps 
in this age of identity theft,193 federal legislation 
might emphasize a requirement for accurate vital 
statistics or, perhaps the Fifth Circuit will eventually 
overrule its interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Lastly, there is the possibility that Adar will 
strengthen future equal protection challenges in the 
Fifth Circuit. 
Adar’s holding rests on the rationale that 
Louisiana may conclude that only married couples 
or single individuals can adopt. Same-sex couples can 
marry now in six states.194 When a same-sex married 
couple adopts a Louisiana-born child, what then? 
Louisiana will either recognize the adoption and 
issue a revised birth certificate as its law requires,195 
or more likely, the state would try to avoid its 
obligations, perhaps summoning DOMA in order to 
avoid recognition. Louisiana will not be able to rely 
on its adoption statute because that classification is 
based on marriage. Louisiana will then have to rely 
on DOMA, the constitutionality of which is not 
yet determined,196 in order to dismiss the parents’ 
marriage. Sheer animus is not a legitimate state 
interest; however, Louisiana’s response to this fact 
pattern just might start to reek of it. 
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Judge Haynes’ powerful dissent in Adar 
might persuade other circuits when faced with 
this or similar issues. One way or another, there is 
the hope that it is only a matter of time until the 
majority holding in Adar is corrected. For, as Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., noted “[t]he moral arc of 
the universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”197 
The arc, unfortunately, does not bend on its own; 
child advocates, scholars, advocacy organizations, 
and lawmakers must refuse to let Adar permanently 
jeopardize children’s rights and exert pressure, until 
the arc leans back towards justice. 
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